Environmental Ethics Literature Research Articles

Hmong Spirituality, Nature, and Place

In this article, I show how the Hmong religion can provide the basis of a novel version of non-human-centered environmentalism. I do this by outlining some of the core doctrines in the Hmong religion and showing what they imply about the value of nature. I then situate the view that is implied by these doctrines into the traditional Western environmental ethics literature on the value of nature. In particular, I argue that the Hmong religion provides a view in environmental ethics that is non-anthropocentric, individualistic, non-egalitarian, and non-biocentric.

The ethics of species extinctions

Abstract This review provides an overview of the ethics of extinctions with a focus on the Western analytical environmental ethics literature. It thereby gives special attention to the possible philosophical grounds for Michael Soulé’s assertion that the untimely ‘extinction of populations and species is bad’. Illustrating such debates in environmental ethics, the guiding question for this review concerns why – or when – anthropogenic extinctions are bad or wrong, which also includes the question of when that might not be the case (i.e. which extinctions are even desirable). After providing an explanation of the disciplinary perspective taken (section “Introduction”), the concept of extinction and its history within that literature are introduced (section “Understanding extinction”). Then, in section “Why (or when) might anthropogenic extinctions be morally problematic?”, different reasons for why anthropogenic extinctions might be morally problematic are presented based on the loss of species’ value, harm to nonhuman individuals, the loss of valuable biological variety and duties to future generations. This section concludes by also considering cases where anthropogenic extinctions might be justified. Section “How to respond to extinctions?” then addresses a selection of topics concerning risks and de-extinction technologies. Finally, the section on “Extinction studies” introduces other viewpoints on the ethics of extinction from the extinction studies literature, followed by the “Conclusion”.

Respecting the Nonhuman Other: Individual Natural Otherness and the Case for Incommensurability of Moral Standing

The concept of natural otherness can be found throughout the environmental ethics literature. Drawing on this concept, this article pursues two aims. For one, it argues for an account of individual natural otherness as stable difference as opposed to accounts of natural otherness that put more emphasis on independence for the purpose of differentiating individual natural otherness from the concept of wildness. Secondly, this account of natural otherness is engaged to argue for a particular way of theorising the moral standing of individual nonhuman entities. While individual natural otherness in itself does not provide an account of whether an entity matters morally in itself (that is, whether it is morally considerable); it points to an account of incommensurable moral significance for all entities which are attributed moral considerability. That is an often-overlooked alternative to egalitarian or hierarchical accounts of moral significance. Individual natural otherness understood in this way in turn provides another explanatory story for why relational accounts of environmental ethics that strongly emphasise the importance of concepts such as wildness are particularly salient.

Looking through the microscope: Microbes as a challenge for theorising biocentrism within environmental ethics

While in the humanities and social sciences at large we can observe posthumanist developments that engage with the microbiome, microbes are still not a major topic of discussion within environmental ethics. That the environmental ethics literature has not engaged extensively with this topic is surprising considering the range of theoretical challenges (and opportunities) it poses for environmental theorising. So, this paper is ‘looking through the microscope’ from an environmental ethics angle in order to see how these little beings challenge what we consider to be ethically relevant and how we conduct moral theorising. Especially interesting is how a focus on microbes can simultaneously support and challenge individualist biocentric intuitions and theories, which attribute moral standing to (some) microbes. Accordingly, the main aim of this paper is to lay out crucial aspects of these challenges and present some initial arguments about why not all of them pose a serious threat to biocentric theorising—including biocentric theories of interspecies justice. The three challenges discussed are (1) the moral significance challenge, (2) the self-defence predicament, and (3) undermining individualist biocentric intuitions.

Coupling property rights with responsibilities to improve conservation outcomes across land and seascapes

AbstractProtecting biodiversity in the face of contemporary conservation challenges requires actions across all land and sea tenures. In seeking improved conservation outcomes across these tenures, we undertook a multidisciplinary review of the property law, conservation and environmental ethics literature. Our review revealed three major threats of property rights to conservation: a focus on tangible goods at the expense of intangible services, a focus on the plot rather than the land or seascape and a focus on rights over responsibilities. Our analysis reveals that overcoming these threats requires a blending of the construct of property with both ecological principles and social values. To this end, we offer a practical, solutions‐focused approach that seeks to determine who has a responsibility, to whom they owe that responsibility and how that responsibility can be ascribed. This approach couples specific property rights with defined responsibilities owed to resource systems to support current and future beneficiaries. A formal recognition of the responsibilities that accompany rights can set the baseline of what society should be able to expect from rights‐holders. From this baseline, policy instruments can be more appropriately applied, supporting landholders in their responsibilities and where necessary, providing compensation for activities that extend beyond their responsibilities.

Pathways from Environmental Ethics to Pro-Environmental Behaviours? Insights from Psychology

Though largely a theoretical endeavour, environmental ethics also has a practical agenda to help humans achieve environmental sustainability. Environmental ethicists have extensively debated the grounds, contents and implications of our moral obligations to nonhuman nature, offering up different notions of an ‘environmental ethic’ with the presumption that, if humans adopt such an environmental ethic, they will then engage in less environmentally damaging behaviours. We assess this presumption, drawing on psychological research to discuss whether or under what conditions an environmental ethic might engender pro-environmental behaviour. We focus discussion on three lines of scholarship in the environmental ethics literature, on 1) intrinsic value, 2) care ethics, and 3) the land ethic. We conclude by commenting generally on both the limits and transformative potential of an environmental ethic in its larger sociocultural context.

Exploring the ins and outs of biodiversity in the moral community

If moral concern for nonhuman nature underpins conservation, it is essential to understand how individuals populate their “moral communities,” a core concept from environmental ethics, with various elements of biodiversity. Using data from an online survey of the United States public (N = 1331), we investigated the extent to which respondents' moral communities align with four worldviews discussed in the environmental ethics literature: anthropocentrism, zoocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. Each worldview provides a vision for how the moral community should be constituted. To assess inclusion in terms consistent with ethical theory, we measured whether and the extent to which respondents included abstract sets of entities (humans, sentient/subjective entities, living organisms, entities with vital interests). To assess inclusion in terms relevant to conservation, we measured whether and the extent to which respondents included specific kinds of entities within those sets (e.g., Americans, cougar, fungus, rainforest ecosystem). Roughly half the sample could be affiliated with anthropocentrism, zoocentrism, biocentrism, or ecocentrism, but these respondents did not always include the specific entities they were expected to include based on ethical theory. However, respondents with more inclusive worldviews did believe more entities are included in the moral community, and also professed those beliefs more strongly than respondents with less inclusive worldviews. If strength of inclusivity beliefs is associated with other pro-conservation attitudes, intentions, and behaviors, then people with larger, more diverse moral communities may more strongly support biodiversity conservation.

Predation, Pain, and Evil

The classical problem of natural evil holds that the suffering of sentient beings caused by natural processes is an evil for which a divinity is morally responsible. Theodicies either explain natural evil as a punitive imperfection in nature, which humans ought to avoid and/or purify, or as a constituent part of a greater good whereby the evil is redeemed. The environmental ethics literature has taken the latter route with respect to the secular problem of natural evil, arguing that local disvalues such as predation or pain are transmuted into systemic-level ecological goods. The anti-hunting literature takes the former route, arguing that humans should not participate in the predatory aspects of the natural order. The anti-predation literature, furthermore, argues that nature should be redeemed – so far as is technologically and economically possible – of its unsavoury predatory aspects. While all sides of the debate employ strategies analogous to those found in the philosophy of religion, the immanentizing function of secularism moves the target of ultimate moral evaluation away from the divine and onto the natural. Environmental ethics’ teleological approach culminates with nature as a transcendent good, whereas anti-hunting and anti-predation critiques view nature in the here-and-now as riven with evil, requiring humans to distance themselves while decontaminating it.

Does environmental archaeology need an ethical promise?

ABSTRACTEnvironmental catastrophes represent profound challenges faced by societies today. Numerous scholars in the climate sciences and the humanities have argued for a greater ethical engagement with these pressing issues. At the same time, several disciplines concerned with hazards are moving towards formalized ethical codes or promises that not only guide the dissemination of data but oblige scientists to relate to fundamentally political issues. This article couples a survey of the recent environmental ethics literature with two case studies of how past natural hazards have affected vulnerable societies in Europe’s prehistory. We ask whether cases of past calamities and their societal effects should play a greater role in public debates and whether archaeologists working with past environmental hazards should be more outspoken in their ethical considerations. We offer no firm answers, but suggest that archaeologists engage with debates in human–environment relations at this interface between politics, public affairs and science.

Islamic Iktisad (Frugality)

Although consumerism has long been recognised as one of the major contributors of environmental destruction, little change in consumer habits have resulted. Knowledge alone of the widespread environmental destruction caused by consumeristic lifestyles simply has not provided the required motivation for behavioural change. Religions have a key role to play, as they have the potential to provide this motivation needed for change. One concept largely absent from religious environmental ethics literature is iktisad, the Islamic concept of frugality, which has the potential to produce this required change in consumeristic behaviour. Iktisad is using only resources that are necessary – no more, no less. Importantly, though, Islamic environmental iktisad is also an important means of spiritual and personal development, which provides added motivation for change without the necessity of a separate environmental consciousness. It is a means of detachment from material goods, allowing for increased contentment, gratitude and enhanced personal relationships. While the motivation for Muslims to implement iktisad may be religious, the personal benefits of iktisad mean it can appeal to all human beings, regardless of religious belief. These motivating factors of iktisad, mean it offers a real, lasting and urgently needed solution to environmental destruction caused by consumerism.

Individualist Biocentrism vs. Holism Revisited

While holist views such as ecocentrism have considerable intuitive appeal, arguing for the moral considerability of ecological wholes such as ecosystems has turned out to be a very difficult task. In the environmental ethics literature, individualist biocentrists have persuasively argued that individual organisms—but not ecological wholes—are properly regarded as having a good of their own . In this paper, I revisit those arguments and contend that they are fatally flawed. The paper proceeds in five parts. First, I consider some problems brought about by climate change for environmental conservation strategies and argue that these problems give us good pragmatic reasons to want a better account of the welfare of ecological wholes. Second, I describe the theoretical assumptions from normative ethics that form the background of the arguments against holism. Third, I review the arguments given by individualist biocentrists in favour of individualism over holism. Fourth, I review recent work in the philosophy of biology on the units of selection problem, work in medicine on the human biome, and work in evolutionary biology on epigenetics and endogenous viral elements. I show how these developments undermine both the individualist arguments described above as well as the distinction between individuals and wholes as it has been understood by individualists. Finally, I consider five possible theoretical responses to these problems.

Animal Representation in the Dutch Media through Environmental Ethics

This article examines two areas of tension within environmental ethics literature and relates them to the case study of the animal representation in the Dutch media. On the one hand, there is a tension between those who propagate clear division between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric views; on the other hand, there is a tension between the land ethics perspective and animal right proponents. This article examines the media representation of animals using content analysis, and links the findings back to the areas of tension within environmental ethics. The main findings indicate that the division between anthropocentric and ecocentric perspectives is still relevant for evaluating the human-animal relations, while the convergence of the land ethics and animal rights perspectives can be helpful in explaining why this division is relevant. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environmental Processes.The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40710-014-0025-7 https://www.linkedin.com/in/helenkopnina/

At the Centre of What? A Critical Note on the Centrism-Terminology in Environmental Ethics

The distinction between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric theories, together with the more fine-grained distinction between anthropocentrism, biocentrism and ecocentrism, are probably two of the most frequently occurring distinctions in the environmental ethics literature. In this essay I draw attention to some problematic aspects of the terminology used to draw these distinctions: the 'centrism-terminology'. I argue that this terminology is ambiguous and misleading, and therefore confusing. Furthermore, depending on which interpretation it is given, it is also either asymmetric and non-inclusive, or superfluous. Although I find it unlikely that the centrism-terminology will be abandoned, I end the essay by providing a suggestion for an alternative way to categorise theories in environmental ethics.

How (Not) to Defend a Rawlsian Approach to Intergenerational Ethics

John Rawls’ account of our obligations towards future generations has received considerable criticism in the environmental ethics literature relative to the scant few passages in which he discusses the issue. I argue that much of this criticism is warranted because Rawls’ Heads of Family strategy for grounding obligations to future generations is not only independently problematic, but also inconsistent with his general framework. Furthermore, the oft-suggested Time Travel strategy will not work either, and for just those reasons which Rawls gave. However, I contend that the less often discussed “Universalizability Principle,” which Rawls discusses most prominently in Political Liberalism , is a plausible account of our obligations to future generations and is consistent with Rawls’ general framework. I then defend this Rawlsian account of our future-oriented obligations against objections in the environmental ethics literature such as those recently advanced by the consequentialist Tim Mulgan.

A Defence of Environmental Stewardship

Public recognition of the fragility of the natural systems on which present and future generations depend has prompted calls for the practice of environmental stewardship – calls widely criticised in the environmental ethics literature. Some argue that stewardship's historical associations entail that it is inherently sexist, speciesist and/or anthropocentric. Others argue that absent belief in a creator to appoint us as stewards and hold us accountable, talk of ‘environmental stewardship’ is empty. I review the concept's recent evolution and provide a tentative definition. I argue that so defined, it is not vulnerable to standard criticisms, but is instead a promising way of construing morally decent conduct towards the environment.

Nanotechnology, Enhancement, and Human Nature

Is nanotechnology-based human enhancement morally permissible? One reason to question such enhancement stems from a concern for preserving our species. It is harder than one might think, however, to explain what could be wrong with altering our own species. One possibility is to turn to the environmental ethics literature. Perhaps some of the arguments for preserving other species can be applied against nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter human nature. This paper critically examines the case for using two of the strongest arguments in the environmental ethics literature to show that nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible: 1) Our species, like many other naturally occurring species, has aesthetic value. So, nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species should be prohibited. 2) Our species plays valuable ecological roles. Nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species are likely to interfere with our species playing our ecologically valuable roles. So, such enhancements should be prohibited. Neither argument, ultimately, proves conclusive. The paper concludes, however, that considerations underlying both arguments may show us that some nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible.

Moral and discursive geographies in the war for biodiversity in Africa

Since the 1980s, several African governments have responded to declining wildlife populations by issuing shoot-on-sight orders for “poachers” found within national parks. War is now a common model and metaphor for conceptualizing and planning biodiversity protection in Africa. Consequently, there is a new moral geography wherein parks and protected areas have become spaces of deadly violence. This article seeks to understand the moral justification for shoot-on-sight protocols in African biodiversity protection and examine the ramifications for the overall level of violence in national parks. It builds on and extends the political ecology analysis of violence and justice through an engagement with the environmental ethics literature. It concludes that a moral justification for shoot on sight and wartime violence cannot be demonstrated within the various philosophical approaches to environmental ethics. Yet wartime ethics and shoot on sight have become taken for granted in Africa. The article posits that discursive analysis can elucidate why this is so. Through a careful analysis of popular media it shows how key identities are discursively constructed to radically reorder the moral standing of African poachers and wild animals. These discursively constructed identities operate to simultaneously humanize wild animals and denigrate poachers, including impoverished peasants searching for small game or fish. As a consequence, it argues, human rights abuses and deadly violence against humans in the defense of “biodiversity” have become normalized within African national parks.

Environmental Ethics and Coastal Dunes in Western Lower Michigan: Developing a Rationale for Ecosystem Preservation

The management of shoreline dune systems in the Great Lakes has long been contested. Some parties have viewed them as a consumable resource, while others have argued for their preservation. These differences arise out of con-trasting views about both the value of the dunes as well as which kind of value overrides which. Some of their value has been seen as residing in their geomorphic uniqueness, an interpretation based on older (largely qualitative) field studies that suggest they are fossil landscape features. Recent findings indicate, however, that most dunes arise from episodic, ongoing processes. Contradictory management implications of this new research can flow either from the heightened empirical uncertainty it has created (which gestures toward preservation) by undermining the prevailing views of dune development and chronology, or from diminished-value arguments it has stimulated (which lessen constraints on consumptive use) by calling into question older views about the geomorphic uniqueness of the dunes. Faced with such a dilemma, for practical guidance on the management of special places we turn to environmental ethics literature, where we find that long-standing disputes about where value in the environment is seated provide little further guidance. Accordingly, we propose that the ethical principle of respecting what others value out of respect for them be applied in such matters. This principle is consistent with both moral intuition and widespread practice, and its application in environmental policy would bypass some of the recalcitrant questions left open by other analyses of environmental value. With certain qualifications, this view then supports preservation of special places like lakeshore dunes regardless of the signal from empirical certainty or uncertainty or disagreement about just why valued places are valuable in the first place.

Religious Responses to Fisheries Decline in Irish Coastal Communities with a Comparison to the Pacific Northwest Region, USA

Worldwide, there is great concern for the depletion of commercial fish stocks (FAO 1997; Le Sann 1998). Much academic ethical analysis of fisheries has been based on Garrett Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’—a simple model of human behavior that concludes: ‘individuals locked into the logic of the commons are free only to bring universal ruin’ (Hardin 1968; de Steiguer 1997; Baden and Noonan 1998). Fishing management has integrated Hardin’s presuppositions into policy design, thereby assuming all fishers are self-profit maximizers, who are inveterate free riders, unaware of conservation. Recently, anthropologists have drawn attention to the dynamics of small, traditional fishing communities, many of which have existed for centuries without collapsing the populations of harvested species, and all of which have some form of indigenous environmental regulation (McGoodwin 1990; Cordell 1989; Dyer and McGoodwin 1994; Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995). This work points to two important deficiencies in the religious environmental ethics literature—relatively little is known about: (1) how specific communities or trades develop an ‘environmental ethic’; and (2) how religious practice and belief respond to changing environmental concerns in industrialized cultures.

Tourism development ethics in the third world

The origins of ethical concern about tourism development in the Third World are traced in both the sociology of development and environmental ethics literature. New secular and religious writings single out the traveler and the tourism industry as objects of ethical concern. This paper presents a preliminary overview of the growing “responsible tourism” and travel ethics literature and explores the significance of anti-tourism activity in the Indian State of Goa. In conclusion, a three-part grouping into Third World development ethics, tourism industry ethics, and personal travel ethics categories is suggested.